Executive Summary
Recent findings from the Acronis Threat Research Unit indicate a decisive operational shift by the Makop ransomware group, with India now accounting for approximately 55% of all global Makop victims. This concentration is highly abnormal by ransomware standards and strongly suggests a deliberate, region-focused campaign rather than opportunistic global spraying.
What makes this campaign particularly concerning is not just the volume of Indian victims, but the degree of customization observed. Makop operators have adapted their tooling, malware delivery chain, and defense evasion techniques specifically to the Indian cybersecurity ecosystem, including the targeted removal of Quick Heal Antivirus, which is widely deployed across Indian SMEs.
This report consolidates the attack chain, tooling, indicators, and defensive gaps being exploited, with a focus on practical implications for Indian organizations.
1. Strategic Shift in Attack Methodology
From Manual Deployment to Multi-Stage Malware Delivery
Historically, Makop relied on manual, hands-on-keyboard ransomware deployment after gaining access to victim networks. In the December 2025 campaign, this changed.
For the first time, Makop operators integrated GuLoader, a well-known and highly evasive malware downloader, into their attack chain.
Why this matters:
- GuLoader enables automated, stealthy payload delivery
- It allows attackers to deploy info-stealers before ransomware
- Detection is harder because GuLoader often masquerades as legitimate executables
This evolution moves Makop closer to the operational maturity seen in larger ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) groups.
2. Initial Access: Still Simple, Still Effective
Despite advanced tooling later in the chain, Makop’s entry point remains basic.
Primary Infection Vector: Exposed RDP
- Internet-facing RDP services (TCP 3389) remain the main entry point
- Attackers use automated scanners and brute-force tools to identify:
- Weak passwords
- No MFA
- No VPN restrictions
Acronis researchers describe Makop as “opportunistic”: they prioritize targets that require minimal effort. The high victim count in India strongly suggests:
- Widespread exposed RDP
- Poor password hygiene
- Limited MFA adoption, especially among SMEs
In many cases, attackers create hidden or backup user accounts after access is gained to maintain persistence.
3. GuLoader: The New First-Stage Payload
Once access is established, attackers deploy GuLoader.
Role of GuLoader in Makop Attacks
GuLoader acts as a shellcode-based downloader, responsible for:
- Fetching secondary malware
- Bypassing traditional signature-based detection
- Staging the environment before ransomware execution
Common evasion techniques observed:
- Polyglot file formats
- Fake filenames mimicking system utilities:
taskmgr.exesvchost.exebug_hand.exe
- Placement in non-standard directories:
%TEMP%%APPDATA%- Music / Video folders
Secondary Payloads Delivered
Before encryption, GuLoader has been observed deploying:
- AgentTesla
- FormBook
- XLoader
- LokiBot
This allows attackers to:
- Steal credentials
- Capture keystrokes and screenshots
- Exfiltrate data for resale or double-extortion leverage
Even if a ransom is not paid, the attackers still monetize the breach.
4. Region-Specific Weaponization: Targeting Indian Defenses
Custom Quick Heal Antivirus Removal
The most alarming development is the discovery of custom-built uninstaller tools designed specifically to remove Quick Heal Antivirus.
This is significant because:
- Quick Heal is predominantly used in India
- Such tooling has little value outside the region
- It confirms intentional targeting, not coincidence
This level of localization is rarely seen outside high-value geopolitical or financially motivated campaigns.
5. Defense Evasion via BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver)
To ensure security tools stay disabled, Makop relies heavily on BYOVD techniques.
How the BYOVD Attack Works
- Attackers drop a legitimate, signed driver with known vulnerabilities
- Windows allows it to load due to trusted signatures
- The vulnerability is exploited to gain kernel-level (Ring 0) access
- From kernel space, attackers forcibly terminate:
- Antivirus
- EDR
- Backup agents
Drivers Observed in Makop Campaigns
- hlpdrv.sys
- Allows arbitrary kernel memory access
- ThrottleStop.sys (CVE-2025-7771)
- Originally a CPU monitoring driver
- Abused to manipulate kernel memory
- Process Hacker / PCHunter drivers
- Used to kill protected processes
Once kernel access is achieved, modern EDR protections become largely ineffective.
6. Living-Off-the-Land and Credential Harvesting
Makop blends malicious activity with legitimate tools to avoid detection.
Legitimate Tools Abused
- Process Hacker / IOBitUnlocker
- Terminate locked services (SQL, Exchange, AV)
- AnyDesk / Splashtop
- Persistent remote access
- NSudo
- Elevated command execution
Credential Theft
To move laterally, attackers deploy:
- Mimikatz
- LaZagne
These tools extract:
- Cached credentials
- Cleartext passwords
- Domain credentials (if available)
This enables rapid spread across internal networks.
7. Privilege Escalation Exploits Observed
Makop operators carry a wide exploit toolkit, targeting both old and recent vulnerabilities to maximize success.
| CVE | Description |
|---|---|
| CVE-2016-0099 | Secondary Logon LPE |
| CVE-2019-0803 | Win32k Kernel LPE |
| CVE-2021-41379 | Windows Installer EoP |
| CVE-2022-24521 | CLFS Driver LPE |
| CVE-2024-XXXX | Various kernel & spooler exploits |
The presence of very old CVEs highlights how often legacy, unpatched systems are still found in Indian SME environments.
8. Final Impact: Encryption and Destruction
Before encryption, attackers execute:
vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet
This removes Volume Shadow Copies, preventing easy recovery.
Encryption Indicators
- Extensions:
.makop.AIR.f69
- Filename format:
originalfile.[VictimID].[email].makop - Ransom Note:
+README-WARNING+.txt- Dropped in every directory and on the desktop
9. Key Indicators of Compromise (IOC Summary)
File & Registry
+README-WARNING+.txt- Registry Run key with numeric names (e.g.,
"1") - Mutex examples:
m23071644(varies)
Processes
- Unexpected termination of:
sql.exeexchange.exeveeam.exe- AV / EDR agents
Drivers
- Presence of:
hlpdrv.sysThrottleStop.syskprocesshacker.sys
10. Defensive Guidance (Priority Actions)
Immediate
- Disconnect affected systems immediately if compromise is suspected
- Hunt for GuLoader activity, not just ransomware binaries
RDP Hardening (Critical)
- Remove RDP from public internet exposure
- Enforce:
- VPN access
- MFA
- Strong password policies
Detection Improvements
- Alert on execution of:
- Process Hacker
- PCHunter
- NSudo
- Monitor for vulnerable driver loading (BYOVD indicators)
Patch Management
- Prioritize kernel, driver, VPN, and firewall patches
- Legacy systems are high-risk and actively targeted
Final Takeaway
Makop’s December 2025 campaign marks a clear evolution from a simple ransomware operation into a regionally adapted threat actor. The targeted dismantling of Indian security products, combined with loader-based malware delivery and kernel-level evasion, places this campaign among the most concerning threats currently facing Indian SMEs.
Makop is not exploiting zero-days — it is exploiting basic security gaps at scale.
