MITRE ATT&CK — Command & Control (Full Mapping)
Table of contents
- Executive summary
- Full C2 technique matrix (TA0011) — techniques & sub-techniques
- Example malware C2 mapping — Cobalt Strike / generic RAT (sample mapping)
- Incident scenario mapping — Phishing -> Intrusion -> C2 -> Data theft
- Detection & telemetry mapping (network, host, cloud, endpoints)
- Mitigations and controls mapped to techniques
1) Executive summary
This document focuses on Command and Control (C2) as defined by MITRE ATT&CK (TA0011). It lists the primary techniques used by adversaries to establish, maintain, and hide communications with compromised systems; shows how those techniques map to a real-world C2 framework (example: Cobalt Strike / Beacon-style); provides an incident-level mapping showing how C2 fits into an intrusion lifecycle; and gives detection, telemetry and mitigation recommendations.
2) Full C2 technique matrix (TA0011)
Below are the ATT&CK techniques and (where applicable) sub-techniques typically associated with the Command and Control tactic. Each entry includes a short description and common signs/indicators.

Note: The above table focuses on techniques that implement C2 and the infrastructure and behaviors attackers use to keep communications alive.
3) Example malware C2 mapping — Cobalt Strike / Generic Beacon-like RAT
Below is a sample mapping for a generic beaconing RAT similar to Cobalt Strike. This is an illustrative mapping you can adapt to a particular sample by replacing indicators and IOCs.
Sample characteristics (generic):
- Periodic HTTPS beacon (randomized intervals)
- Uses POST to
/submitand GET to/taskendpoints - Tasks encoded in base64 and may be AES-encrypted
- Implements fallback domains + embedded IP list
- Supports file upload/download, port forwarding, and interactive shells
Mapping
- Initial C2 channel: T1071.001 (Web Protocols) + T1573 (Encrypted Channel)
- Beaconing pattern: Observed periodic outbound POSTs (Network detection: beaconing analysis)
- Fallback & rotation: DGAs / domain rotation (Infrastructure technique)
- File transfer / stage: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) via HTTPS
- Obfuscation: T1001.003 (Protocol Impersonation) — HTTP headers mimic common browsers
- Proxying / pivoting: T1090 (Proxy) when the RAT config uses internal relays
- Use of legitimate cloud: If beacon checks GitHub for tasking -> T1102 (Web Service)
Telemetry to collect for a sample:
- Process name, PID, parent process, command line
- Network connections (remote IP, remote domain, local port)
- TLS fingerprints (JA3/JA3S), SNI values, HTTP headers, URI patterns
- Files written to disk and hashes
- DNS query patterns (labels, frequency, response size)
- Scheduled tasks/registry run keys (persistence)
Sample Hunting Queries (examples)
- Network: “Find hosts with periodic POSTs to domains with low reputation and POST body > 512 bytes”.
- DNS: “Find hosts making repeated TXT queries or long label queries to external domains”.
- Endpoint: “Processes making encrypted outbound connections where parent process is a user app (e.g., explorer.exe) and child code not signed.”
4) Incident scenario mapping — Phishing -> Credential theft -> C2 -> Data exfiltration
Scenario summary (steps):
- Phishing email with malicious attachment (macro) — initial access (T1566)
- Macro downloads a payload (T1204 -> T1105) and executes a loader
- Loader writes a beaconing RAT that beacons to attacker C2 over HTTPS (T1071.001 + T1573)
- RAT enumerates files and lives on host. It uses scheduled tasks to maintain persistence
- Attacker issues commands to collect and compress sensitive files, then uses DNS tunneling as fallback C2 if HTTPS is blocked (T1071.004)
- Data exfil via encrypted POSTs to attacker endpoint (T1071.001) or via DNS exfil (T1071.004)
Mapping (MITRE technique IDs attached to steps):
- Phishing: T1566 (Phishing)
- User execution: T1204 (User Execution)
- Download/Install: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer)
- Beaconing C2: T1071.001 (Web Protocols) + T1573 (Encrypted Channel)
- DNS fallback/tunneling: T1071.004 (DNS)
- Persistence: (e.g., T1053 scheduled task, T1547 service)
- Exfiltration: T1041 (Exfil over C2 channel) or T1071.004 if DNS exfil
Detection opportunities per phase:
- Email gateway logging + attachment detonation (phishing detection)
- Host payload writes, unusual child processes, new scheduled tasks
- Outbound beaconing patterns from endpoint network logs
- High-entropy DNS labels and many NXDOMAINs for DGA-style fallback
- Data transfer anomalies: large POST bodies to rare external endpoints
5) Detection & telemetry mapping
Group telemetry and detection controls by source.
Network telemetry
- DNS logs: Query frequency, label entropy, NXDOMAIN rate, TXT sizes
- Proxy/HTTP logs: URI patterns, SNI, POST sizes, user-agent anomalies, domain reputation
- TLS fingerprints: JA3/JA3S; mismatches between certificate details and domain
- Netflow / IP logs: Long-lived connections to unusual endpoints; multi-hop patterns
Host telemetry
- Process creation logs: Parent-child mapping, unusual parent process (e.g., Word -> PowerShell -> net.exe)
- File system: New binaries in user temp, hidden directories, suspicious file hashes
- Registry / scheduled tasks: Persistence artifacts
- Memory: In-memory-only loaders, suspicious handle of network sockets
Cloud/SaaS telemetry
- API calls: Unusual calls to GitHub, Pastebin, or cloud storage with encoded payloads
- Service logs: New OAuth app authorizations, unusual app-scoped tokens
Detection signatures & behavioural detections
- Beacon detection: Periodicity analysis, pulse-detection algorithms
- DNS tunneling detectors: Entropy, uncommon record types, long labels
- TLS abnormality: JA3 mismatches, odd cipher suites, self-signed certs for public domains
- User-initiated remote tools: Presence of remote access software with no ticketing/approval
6) Mitigations and controls mapped to techniques
Use the ATT&CK mitigation controls and map them to the specific techniques shown above.
| Control / Mitigation | Techniques addressed |
| Network segmentation and least-privilege egress controls (allowlist outbound) | T1071.*, T1090, T1102 |
| TLS inspection and proxying (with privacy considerations) | T1573, T1071. |

