CVE-2025-14740: Docker Desktop Installer Flaw Lets Local Users Hijack Execution on Windows Hosts

CVE-2025-14740 — Docker Desktop for Windows: Local Privilege/Execution Flaw

CVE Identifier: CVE-2025-14740
Affected Product: Docker Desktop for Windows
Severity: Medium
Exploitability: Local access required
Impact: Local attacker can escalate to arbitrary code execution
Official patch / update link: https://docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes/

What is CVE-2025-14740?

This vulnerability was introduced by how Docker Desktop for Windows installed and set permissions on a system folder used during installation and runtime. Specifically, the installer created a shared folder at C:\ProgramData\DockerDesktop without locking down ownership and access rights properly before files were placed inside it.

The problem arises because a regular local (non-administrator) user can end up owning this directory or inserting files into it at certain times. Docker Desktop later loads configuration files from this directory when it starts. If an attacker can slip in a malicious configuration or helper binary, the Docker process may end up running that code — effectively giving the attacker the ability to execute arbitrary code in the security context of the person running Docker.

This issue can be thought of as a combination of two things:

A permissions problem (the installer let an unprivileged user own or modify a location that later becomes trusted), and
A Timing-Of-Check/Time-Of-Use (TOCTOU) scenario (the attacker can inject files in the moment before security restrictions are fully in place).

Because of these two weaknesses combined, what should have been a harmless installer step could be used to hijack how Docker runs on a system.

How Could This Be Exploited?

An attacker must already have low-privilege local access on the Windows machine. This could happen in environments where:

Multiple users log on to the same workstation,
There is an unprotected remote desktop / VNC service,
Granting of local accounts is not tightly controlled,
Or during a software install process where the attacker has momentary read/write access.

Here are the likely exploitation paths:

1. Pre-create the DockerDesktop Folder

Before Docker is ever installed:

A normal user account creates the folder C:\ProgramData\DockerDesktop.
Because the user created it, they are the owner even after installation.
The installer then writes config files there under the assumption it controls the folder.
The attacker, still the owner, replaces or alters config values.

2. Race the Installer During Setup

During installation:

There is a brief window where the installer has created the folder but not yet locked down permissions.
A watcher script detects this and quickly puts malicious config / helper files in place.
When Docker Desktop installation completes, those files are trusted and loaded later.

3. Malicious Credential Helpers

Docker uses credential helpers — small helper programs — to manage Docker credentials securely. A malicious helper can be pointed to by config in this folder. If Docker loads it, the attacker’s code runs with the rights of the local user who launched Docker.

Once hooked in this way, every time Docker Desktop starts, that malicious helper will run as if it were a legitimate part of the installation.

Can This Lead to Full System Compromise?

Not by itself. You cannot exploit this remotely without having local access first. The flaw does not open a network listening port or allow remote login by itself. However, if an attacker already has a foothold on the machine — even with very limited access — this vulnerability can be the pivot that gives them the ability to execute code in richer contexts. In certain configurations where Docker Desktop integrates with Linux Subsystem for Windows (WSL2) or runs privileged helper processes, additional privilege escalation could occur.

In summary:

Step 1: Attacker needs local access.
Step 2: Attacker abuses weak installer permissions.
Step 3: When Docker Desktop runs, attacker’s code runs too.

Is There Public Exploit Code?

At the time of publication, there is no widely shared public proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit script or tool available. That does not mean someone couldn’t write one; it simply means no reliable exploit has been made public. The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed and a patch released before public exploitation became common.

PoC code on random forums or unverified repositories should be treated with extreme caution — often they are outdated, non-functional, or contain unrelated malware.

How Could You Detect Abuse or Exploitation?

Since this is a local access attack, detection focuses on suspicious activity against the install directory and unexpected helper binaries being run.

What to Watch For

Abnormal ownership on DockerDesktop folder
- The folder C:\ProgramData\DockerDesktop should not be owned by a regular user. If it is, that’s a red flag.
Creation or modification of files in that folder by non-admin accounts
- Especially things like install-settings.json, docker-config.json, or any .exe files that don’t belong to Docker.
Executables running from unusual locations
- Legitimate Docker helpers are part of the installation and live under the Docker directory. If something in C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Temp\… or under ProgramData that doesn’t look official is started, that is suspicious.
Parent process timeline
- Check if suspicious file writes happened around the same time as Docker installation or upgrade.

Where to Get Logs From

To build alerts and forensics, you want to gather the following log sources:

Windows Event Logs

Security Log
- Enable object access auditing on the Docker install folder. This will show who read/wrote files inside that folder.
- Look for events showing file creation or modification by users who should not have administrative rights.

Application Logs

Docker Desktop produces logs that can show when its credential helpers are invoked, or when configuration files fail to load.

Process Creation Logs

Monitoring for instances of executables running from non-standard locations (not in the Docker installation path).

File System Activity

Tools like Sysmon or Windows built-in auditing can help track unexpected file writes.

Detection Queries

Below are example detection queries you can adapt for your SIEM or log platform. These are designed for ESPL / KQL / Splunk / Elastic — not Sigma.

Search for suspicious ownership on the DockerDesktop folder

index=windows_security EventCode=4663 
Object_Name="C:\\ProgramData\\DockerDesktop\\*" 
| stats latest(Account_Name) by Object_Name
| where Account_Name != "SYSTEM" AND Account_Name != "Administrators"

Creation of DockerDesktop files by non-admin users

index=windows_security EventCode=4663 
Object_Name="C:\\ProgramData\\DockerDesktop\\*" 
Access_Mask="0x2" 
AND NOT Account_Name IN ("SYSTEM","Administrator","DockerServiceAccount")

Execution of binaries from unexpected paths

index=process_creation Image!="C:\\Program Files\\Docker\\*" 
AND (Image LIKE "C:\\ProgramData\\DockerDesktop\\%.exe" 
OR Image LIKE "C:\\Users\\%\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\%")

Unusual modification dates around install time

index=fs_activity path="C:\\ProgramData\\DockerDesktop\\*" 
| eval time_diff = _time - install_start_time
| where time_diff < 600

How to Mitigate the Issue

1. Apply the Official Update

Go to the official Docker Desktop release notes and download the latest build that specifically mentions a fix for this vulnerability:
https://docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes/

This update corrects how the installer sets permissions and ownership on the DockerDesktop folder so that regular users cannot influence it.

2. Check and Correct Folder Ownership

After updating:

Inspect C:\ProgramData\DockerDesktop
Ensure that only SYSTEM or Administrators own it.
Remove any non-admin ownership.

You can do this manually or with standard Windows admin tools.

3. Enable Auditing for Object Access

Turn on detailed object access auditing so you can see who is creating, modifying, or deleting files in the Docker installation directory.

4. Monitor Process Execution Patterns

Be alert for non-standard helpers being launched or anything that looks like an unexpected executable running from ProgramData or user temp directories.

What Does a Malicious Configuration Look Like?

For educational detection purposes, a typical red-flag entry in the Docker configuration might look like:

"credentialHelper": "C:\\Users\\RegularUser\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\evil-helper.exe"

That type of path — bringing in a helper from a user temp folder — should only appear in analysis logs, never in real production setups.

Final Takeaway

CVE-2025-14740 is a local vulnerability in Docker Desktop for Windows tied to improper installer permissions.
It does not allow remote attackers to take over your system. But if someone has low-privilege access locally, it can be used to escalate to arbitrary code execution.
There is no widely available exploit script in the public domain at this time, but the flaw is real and should be patched quickly.
Detection focuses on abnormal ownership, file writes, and unexpected helper binaries.
The simplest and most effective fix is to apply the official update from Docker.

Official patch/update link to fix this issue:

👉 https://docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes/