Vulnerability Overview
- CVE ID: CVE-2025-53967
- Affected Product: Framelink Figma MCP Server (figma-developer-mcp)
- Vulnerability Type: OS Command Injection
- Attack Type: Remote
- Authentication Required: None
- Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE)
- CVSS v3.1 Score: 8.0
- Severity: High
- Exploit Maturity: Proof-of-concept available (educational / testing use)
- User Interaction: Not required
Executive Summary
A high-severity command injection vulnerability exists in the Framelink Figma MCP Server. Due to improper handling of user-supplied input, arbitrary operating system commands may be executed on the host running the MCP service. Exploitation does not require authentication and may be performed remotely if the MCP server is exposed to a network.
The vulnerability arises from unsafe construction and execution of shell commands using unsanitized input parameters. An attacker can inject shell metacharacters into specific request fields, resulting in full command execution under the privileges of the MCP service process.
If exploited, this issue may lead to complete system compromise, including unauthorized file access, data exfiltration, credential theft, lateral movement, and persistence installation.
Affected Versions
- All versions of figma-developer-mcp prior to v0.6.3
Root Cause Analysis
The vulnerability is caused by improper neutralization of special characters when user input is passed to a shell command.
Internally, the MCP server constructs a system command (using tools such as curl) by concatenating user-controlled input into a command string. This command string is then executed using a shell execution method.
Because shell execution is performed without strict input validation or argument separation, special characters such as:
$()- backticks
` ;|&&>,<
are interpreted by the operating system shell instead of being treated as literal data.
As a result, arbitrary commands supplied by an attacker are executed directly on the host.
Attack Surface
The attack surface includes:
- MCP server HTTP interface
- JSON-RPC endpoints (e.g.,
tools/call) - Any deployment where the MCP service is:
- bound to a non-localhost interface
- reachable from local networks, CI/CD pipelines, containers, or developer workstations
Exploitation Details (Educational)
Exploitation Method
Exploitation is performed by sending a crafted request to the MCP server containing shell metacharacters within a parameter that is later embedded into a system command.
A commonly abused parameter is one used to identify Figma file resources. When this parameter is injected with shell syntax, arbitrary commands are executed.
Proof-of-Concept (PoC)
Note: The following information is provided strictly for educational, testing, and defensive purposes.
An attacker may send a JSON-RPC request similar to the following:
{
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "get_figma_data",
"arguments": {
"fileKey": "$(id > /tmp/poc_test)"
}
}
}
Result
- The injected command is executed by the operating system.
- A file such as
/tmp/poc_testis created. - The contents of the file confirm execution of the injected command.
This demonstrates successful remote code execution.
Impact Assessment
If successfully exploited, the following impacts should be expected:
- Arbitrary command execution
- Unauthorized file creation or modification
- Exposure of environment variables and API keys (including Figma tokens)
- Access to source code, credentials, and secrets
- Pivoting into internal networks
- Compromise of CI/CD pipelines
- Persistence mechanisms installed on host
The level of damage depends on the privileges under which the MCP server process is running.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command
- ATT&CK Techniques:
- T1190 – Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1059 – Command and Scripting Interpreter
Detection and Monitoring Guidance
Primary Log Sources to Monitor
- MCP application logs
- HTTP access logs (reverse proxy, Node.js server)
- Host process execution logs
- File integrity monitoring logs
- EDR / Sysmon / auditd logs
- Container runtime logs (if applicable)
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
The following patterns should be treated as suspicious when observed in requests or logs:
$(or)- Backticks
` &&,||,|- Output redirection operators
>or< - Unexpected shell commands embedded in JSON values
- File creation in
/tmp,/var/tmp, or user home directories nodeornpxspawning shell processes unexpectedly
Detection Logic
HTTP Payload Detection
Trigger alerts when:
- HTTP POST requests target MCP tool endpoints
- JSON request bodies contain shell metacharacters
- Fields such as
fileKeycontain unexpected symbols or command strings
Host-Based Detection
Monitor for:
- Child processes spawned by
nodeornpx - Execution of
sh,bash, orcurlby MCP service - Unusual file creation activity by MCP service account
Recommended Mitigation and Remediation
Immediate Actions
- Upgrade the MCP server to the fixed version immediately
- Restrict MCP service exposure to localhost where possible
- Block external access using firewall or network policies
- Rotate API keys and credentials used by the service
Official Patch / Upgrade
The vulnerability is fully resolved by upgrading to figma-developer-mcp version 0.6.3 or later.
Official upgrade link:
👉 https://github.com/GLips/Figma-Context-MCP/releases/tag/v0.6.3
Long-Term Hardening Recommendations
- Avoid shell execution with user input
- Replace shell-based execution with argument-based process execution
- Enforce strict input validation
- Implement allow-listing for parameters
- Enable application-level logging for command execution paths
- Regularly audit developer tooling exposed on networks
Final Takeaway
This vulnerability highlights the risks associated with exposing developer tooling without strict access controls and input validation. Even tools intended for local or internal use can become high-risk when deployed improperly.
Organizations running the Framelink Figma MCP Server should treat this issue as a high-priority remediation item and ensure patching and monitoring are completed without delay.
