CVE-2026-24888 — Maker.js Prototype Pollution Vulnerability
Vulnerability Overview
CVE ID: CVE-2026-24888
Affected Component: Maker.js
Affected Function: makerjs.extendObject
Vulnerability Class: Prototype Pollution
Severity: Medium
CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 6.5
Attack Vector: Network
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: None
Exploit Maturity: Conceptually exploitable; no widely published weaponized exploit observed
Impact Scope: Application logic manipulation, security control bypass, and potential vulnerability chaining
Official Patch / Upgrade Link (only official link):
👉 https://github.com/microsoft/maker.js/security/advisories/GHSA-2cp6-34r9-54xx
Description of the Vulnerability
A prototype pollution vulnerability was identified in Maker.js versions up to and including 0.19.1. The issue resides in the internal utility function extendObject, which was designed to merge properties from one object into another.
During this merging process, object properties were copied without validation, without ownership checks, and without filtering special JavaScript meta-properties. As a result, properties such as __proto__, constructor, and prototype could be injected into destination objects.
Because JavaScript objects inherit from prototypes, modification of these prototype properties allowed attackers to influence the behavior of unrelated objects across the application runtime. This condition is known as prototype pollution.
The vulnerability was corrected in Maker.js version 0.19.2, where defensive checks were introduced to prevent unsafe property propagation.
Technical Root Cause
The vulnerability occurred due to the following conditions:
- Properties were copied using generic iteration logic
hasOwnProperty()validation was not enforced- Dangerous keys capable of mutating object prototypes were not blocked
- Nested objects were processed without sanitization
This allowed attacker-controlled input objects to modify global or shared object prototypes indirectly.
Impact and Risk Assessment
While the vulnerability does not directly result in remote code execution on its own, the following impacts were observed as possible outcomes:
- Application logic manipulation
- Security validation bypass
- Privilege flag injection
- Unexpected behavior across unrelated components
- Increased risk of follow-on exploitation when chained with other vulnerabilities
In environments where Maker.js is used in backend services, automation pipelines, or developer tooling that processes untrusted input, the risk is elevated.
Exploitation Scenario (Educational Purpose Only)
To exploit this vulnerability, the following conditions must be met:
- User-controlled input must reach
extendObjector a wrapper function calling it - The input must be treated as an object without sanitization
- The merged object must later influence logic or security decisions
Example Educational Payload
{
"__proto__": {
"isPrivileged": true
}
}
When processed by the vulnerable function, this payload could result in isPrivileged being present on all objects inheriting from Object.prototype.
Proof-of-Concept Status
- No confirmed public exploit toolkit is currently circulating
- No known automated exploit frameworks target this CVE specifically
- The vulnerability pattern is well understood and easily testable
Due to the simplicity of prototype pollution mechanics, exploitation feasibility should be considered high if a vulnerable code path exists.
Detection and Identification
Indicators of Attempted Exploitation
The following patterns may indicate exploitation attempts:
- Incoming JSON containing:
__proto__constructorprototype
- Unexpected boolean or privilege-style properties appearing across objects
- Logic behaving inconsistently without corresponding code changes
Runtime Verification Checks
A quick defensive runtime check can be implemented to detect pollution:
if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty("isPrivileged")) {
// Prototype pollution suspected
}
If unexpected properties are found on Object.prototype, immediate investigation is recommended.
Log Sources to Monitor
The following log sources should be monitored closely:
- Web server access logs (request bodies where possible)
- Application request parsing logs
- Debug logs capturing object merges or configuration loading
- Dependency and build logs identifying Maker.js versions
- Runtime anomaly or integrity monitoring systems
Detection Rules
IDS / IPS Rule
Detect JSON payloads containing "__proto__", "constructor", or "prototype"
within HTTP request bodies.
SIEM Rule Logic
Condition:
RequestBody contains "__proto__"
OR RequestBody contains "constructor"
OR RequestBody contains "prototype"
Severity: Medium
Action: Alert + Log Request Context
Behavioral Rule
- Alert when inherited properties appear on application objects that were never explicitly defined
- Alert when application state changes without corresponding configuration updates
Mitigation and Remediation
Immediate Actions
- Upgrade Maker.js to version 0.19.2 or later
- Redeploy all applications using patched dependencies
- Confirm transitive dependencies do not bundle older versions
Temporary Mitigation
- Sanitize all incoming objects
- Explicitly delete dangerous keys before processing
- Enforce strict allowlists for object merging
Example sanitization logic:
function sanitize(input) {
if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null) return input;
delete input.__proto__;
delete input.constructor;
delete input.prototype;
for (const key in input) {
sanitize(input[key]);
}
return input;
}
MITRE Classification
- CWE: CWE-1321 — Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes
- Attack Pattern: Prototype Pollution
Security Best Practices Going Forward
- Avoid generic object merging with untrusted data
- Prefer structured schema validation
- Use immutable configuration objects
- Monitor prototype integrity at runtime
- Include prototype pollution checks in security testing
Final Takeaway
CVE-2026-24888 is a classic but impactful prototype pollution vulnerability caused by unsafe object property copying in Maker.js. While the severity is classified as medium, the real-world impact depends heavily on how and where the library is used.
The issue has been fully resolved by the vendor, and upgrading remains the definitive fix. Detection and monitoring controls should be implemented to identify both attempted and successful exploitation, particularly in environments where untrusted input is processed.
